The protocols ought to be analysed accurately, realistically and formally. General considerations and specific examples are presented to enlighten the intuitive meaning of these terms exhaustively. This contribution aims at drawing attention to an important niche in computer security.
I. OVERVIEW
Computer Security became a science (and an art) with the development of large-scale computer networks, that is in the late 1960s. Before those years, security merely meant to limit physical access to the sensitive nodes of the net work. Technology progressed fast, thus the figure of a new expert became necessary, the security architect. We are not going to survey the history of computer security here, but a few observations are necessary to set the ground for our discussion on Information Assurance for secure distributed No boolean statement about the strengths of the installed software would be conceivable.
Semi-trusted code. Code downloaded from the Internet should not be entirely trusted. A number of viruses spread through the world as email attachments for example. A possible strategy to control the behaviour of the code and limit its potential damages is to execute it in a sandbox, as is the case of Java applets. The principal is granted fine-grained access control for each potentially dangerous call, so he can take informed decisions. But experience shows that to run code in a sandbox may result lengthy and tedious, so that the principal ends up giving many too permissions to the code anyway. Even more crucial is the problem of executing code from different origins, hence with different levels of trust, in the same runtime. Some levels may have to be lowered or decreased. Techniques based on inspection of the execution stack or on execution history are currently being developed [4] .
The third Millennium seems to be favouring an increas ing awareness about the issues sketched above, which sup-port the claim that "Security is not a simple boolean pred icate" [5] . Worse yet, complete security still seems out of reach or perhaps impossible. Modern security architects normally build their arguments on top of such postulates.
As from the late 1980s they have also started to take into account insights derived from formal analyses, which were just beginning to be conceived, as opposed to the merely in formal analyses they relied on before. Skepticism has gone up and down throughout the years, but the contribution of formal reasoning in general is nowadays unquestionable.
This can be seen throughout nearly all niches of computer security, ranging from policies [6, 7] to protocols [8, 9] .
Our purpose here is to provide an account for Informa tion Assurance ("IA" in the following) in the fi eld of secure distributed communications, which the literature appears to be lacking. We advance a tentative notion stating that fA for secure distributed communications is re liance on security protocoltl that have undergone accurate, realistic and formal analysis.
The general impossibility of making strong boolean claims in the fi eld of security, which we have exemplified above, convinces that protocol analyses must be accurate and capture some notion of "level" of the goals achieved by a protocol. Likewise, protocol analyses must be realis tic and admit that the present ratio cost/technology allows every Internet principal to be a potential attacker -each attacker is in a condition to exploit attacks mounted by other principals for his own sake. Also, security architects require formal assurance that a protocol meets its goals in the real world, which is intrinsically difficult because for mal models somewhat idealise reality. Hence, an expressive formalism is needed.
The defi nition is purposely abstract so as to suscitate different views among different researchers, and hopefully give occasion to the international debate on a niche of com puter security that at present deserves consideration. Our own views of the three provisos of accuracy, realism and formalism are given in the following sections respectively ( §II, §III, §IV). The last section ( §V) draws some conclu sions.
II. ACCURACY
We concentrate on the goals of confidentiality and au thentication. Confidentiality of a message means that the message remains undisclosed to those not intended to learn it. Authentication of a principal means that we truly are communicating with that principal.
We observe that neither of these two properties is boolean in the real world: only certain levels of confiden tiality or authentication are achieved in practice. Levels Confidentiality. To set about this goal, let us consider ses sion keys for example. One or two of them are invented per each session (that is, execution) of a protocol, the reason being that each key is only meant to be used for a short lifetime. Clearly one such key is less sensitive information than a principal's password or PIN number, whose lifetimes usually are considerably long. That is to say that the ac ceptable level of confi dentiality on a session key is lower than the acceptable level of confidentiality on a password.
Most protocols follow this proviso. While session keys may be sent within message bodies on repeated occasions, pass words are only used as encryption keys typically once or twice. Indeed, sending a secret over the network exposes it to risks. The more the secret is used to form messages, the higher the risks that an attacker tampers with itthe longer the secret is on the network, the higher the risks it runs. Also, we may have chains of session keys, each encrypting the next one. The confidentiality levels of the keys decrease along the chain, as confidentiality of each key rests on confidentiality of all preceding keys. In prac tice, one would prefer to rely on cipher-texts sealed under the first key in the chain rather than under the last one.
Kerberos [11] and the Yahalom protocol [12], for example,
have dependency chains of length two. SET features an even longer chain [13] .
Such a dependency chain is a didactic example, but we remark that all protocols exchange components some of which are more sensitive than others.
Once fixed criteria are established to manipulate the se curity levels, the protocol analyser could even compare the security level achieved by different protocols on sensitive message components.
For example, the analyser could consider two different key-distribution protocols, such as
Otway-Rees and Kerberos as they are presented by Bur rows et al. [14] , and study what confi dentiality levels they achieve on the session key. This would give security ar chitects deeper insights than current analyses do. As men tioned above, a secret runs risks of leaking that are propor tional to the time it has been on the network. Therefore, one appropriate criterion to manipulate the security levels is to decrease the level associated to a message component every time that component is manipulated by any of the operations on messages (concatenation, splitting, encryp tion and decryption) -see §IV.
A message that has been disclosed to the attacker can be seen as having the minimum confidentiality level. This inspires a strategy to compare confidentiality attacks. For example, if we use Roman numbers, then leaking a mes sage that was I-confi dential reports a more signifi cant at tack than leaking a message that was V-confi dential. To the best of our knowledge, such accuracy is missing to ex isting protocol analyses, but we find it an indispensable prerequisite of appropriate IA for secure distributed com munications.
Authentication. [18] . The second aspect of our notion of IA for secure distributed communications, is the use of realistic threat models in the sense described above.
Here is one example of a previously unknown insight that our threat model allows us to get. Figure 1 . The protocol assumes that prinCipals can invent truly-random nonces, so that, given a nonce N invented by an principal P, the probability that principals other than P guess N is negligible.
1.
A -> B : �Na, A� Kb 2.
B -> A ; �Na, Nb� Ka
3.
A -> B ; �Nb� Kb The first step sees an initiator A initiate the protocol with a responder B. Principal A invents a nonce Na and encrypts it along with her identity under B's public key.
Upon reception of that message, B decrypts it and extracts
A's nonce. Then, he invents a nonce Nb and encrypts it along with Na under A's public key. When A receives message 2, she extract Nb and sends it back to B, encrypted under his public key.
The goal of the protocol is authentication; at comple tion of a protocol session initiated by A with B, A should get evidence to have communicated with B and, likew ise, B should get evidence to have communicated with A. We emphasise how confidentiality of the nonces is here used to achieve authentication. Indeed, upon reception of Na inside message 2, A would conclude that she is interacting with B, the only principal who could retrieve Na from mes sage 1, since Na is a truly-random nonce and encryption is perfect. In the same fashion, when B receives Nb inside message 3, he would conclude that A was at the other end of the network because Nb must have been obtained from message 2, and no-one but A could perform this operation.
However, Lowe shows that this protocol is flawed [20] by exhibiting the attack we present in figure 2.
Notice that C could be a registered principal of the net work, so no-one could suspect his tampering. Since A initi ates with C, she encrypts her nonce and her identity under C's public key. Once obtained these data, C initiates an other session (indicated by the primes) with another prin cipal B, quoting A's data rather than his own. From this Lowe's attack to the Needham-Schroeder Protocol message, B deduces that A is trying to communicate with him. Therefore, B replies to A, quoting her nonce and his own, Nb. Since the entire network is under C's con trol, C intercepts this message before it is delivered to A but cannot decrypt it because encryption is perfect. So, C forwards it to A. The message is of the form that A was expecting, hence A extracts Nb and sends it to the principal with whom she had initiated the first session, C.
This hinders the confidentiality of Nb, so C can use it to complete the session with B by issuing message 3', which is of the form that B was expecting.
As a result , B believes to have communicated with A, However, we observe that the exhibition of an attack raises more interest among the security architects than the exhibition of a proof that a goal is met. While it is easy to verify that the former can take place, it is less easy to be lieve that a formal proof woul d still hold in the real world.
Such skepticism is motivated by the idealised models within
which any formal proof is conducted. Although it is virtu ally impossible to bridge the gap between a formal model an d the real world, following our second requirement ( §III)
certainly is an improvement. Reluctance towards formal proofs that goals are met also comes from the nature of the offered insights. These are firm boolean claims of the form "session key K is confidential" or "principal A au thenticates principal B", while security architects in prac tice rely on levels of those goals, whose importance was stated above by our first requirement ( §II).
The third aspect of our notion of IA for secure dis tributed communications is therefore formal analysis, which, as remarked above, is severely limited on its own, but can be powered with the other two requirements. It was not obvious in the beginning what approa.ch to proto col analysis could embed all three requirements, but Con straint Solving soon seemed to be an appropriate candi date [25J. We present here only the basics of our approach, which is at the same time accurate, realistic and formal.
The complete description can be found elsewhere [26] . It should be remarked that ours is one possible approach that embeds all three features, but certainly others may be taken. We expect that some existing formal approaches can be extended to accommodate our first two requirements ( §II, §III).
A. Basics of Soft Constraint Programming
Informall y speaking, given a set of variables V and a set of domain values D, a constraint is a law that associates n-tuples of domain elements to n-tuples of variables. A soft constraint is a constraint where each association of its variables has an associated value from a partially ordered set A. On this set, two operations are defined that allow for combination, x, and comparison, +. If 0 is the unit element of +, and 1 is the unit element of x, we can require appropriate properties on the two operations so that the tuple (A, +, x, 0,1) is a c-semiring [27] . Let us consider the relation '5.8 over A such that a '5.8 b iff a + b = b. Then it is possible to prove that:
• '5.8 is a partial order; • + and x are monotone on '5.8;
• 0 is its minimum and 1 its maximum;
• (A, '5.8) is a complete lattice and, for all a, bE A, a +b = lub(a, b). The relation '5.8 gives us a way to compare (some of the) tuples of values and constraints. In fact, when we have a '5.8 b, we will say that b is better than a. Below, a '5.8 b will be often indicated by '5..
A constraint system is a tuple as = (8, D, V) where 8 is a c-semiring, D is a finite set (the domain of the variables) and V is an ordered set of variables. Given a semiring S = (A, +, x, 0, 1) and a constraint system as = (8, V, V), a constraint is a pair (def, con) where con � V and def : Dlconl -+ A. Therefore, a constraint specifies a set of variables (the ones in con), and assigns to each tuple of values of these variables an element of the semiring.
A soft constraint satisfaction problem (SCSP) is a pair (C, con) where con � V and a is a set of constraints: con is the set of variables of interest for the constraint set a, which however may concern also variables not in con.
Combining and projecting soft constraints. Given two con straints Cl = (de! l' con1) and C2 = (deI2' con2), their combination Cl 0C2 is the constraint (de!, con) defined by can = conl '-{ con2 and def(t) = de! 1 (t !��J)x de! 2 (t !���B ), where t !y denotes the tuple of values over the variables in Y, obtained by projecting tuple t from X to Y. In words, combining two constraints means building a new constraint involving all the variables of the original ones, and which associates to each tuple of domain values for such variables a semiring element which is obtained by multiplying the elements associated by the original constraints to the ap propriate subtuples.
Given a constraint c = (de!, can) and a subset I of V, the projection of c over I, written c .u.I is the con straint (de!" can') where con' = can n I and de!, (t') = Lt/tl""n =t' de!(t). Informally, projecting means elimiIncofl nating some variables. This is done by associating to each tuple over the remaining variables a semi ring element which is the sum of the elements associated by the original con straint to all the extensions of this tuple over the eliminated variables.
Solutions. The solution of an SCSP problem P = (C, con) is the constraint Sol(P) = ((8) C) .u.con. That is, we com bine all constraints, and then project over the variables in 0-7803-8572-1/Q4/$20.00 ©2004 lEEE con. In this way we get the constraint over con which is "induced" by the entire SCSP.
B. Soft Constraint Programming to analysing security PT'O tocols
We define the security semiring to specify each princi pal's trust on the confidentiality of each message, that is each principal's security level on each message. The secu rity levels form the career set L of the security semiring. The structure Ssec = (L, + sec, xsec, public, unknown) can be easily proved to be a c-semiring.
Using the security semiring, we define the network con straint system, which represents the computer network on which the security protocols can be executed. It does not depend on any specific protocol. It is expressed as CSn = (Ssw V, V) where:
• Ssec is the security semiring just mentioned;
• V is a bounded set of variables, each standing for a prin cipal;
• 'D is a bounded set of values including the empty mes sage � � and all atomic messages, as well as all messages recursively obtained by concatenation and encryption.
The development of the principals' security levels from manipulation of the messages seen during the protocol ses sions can be formalised as a security entailment, which is an entailment relation between constraints [21] . The re lation is defined by four rules, one for each operation on the messages (splitting, decryption, concatenation and en cryption). In brief, every time a principal invents a se cret message, the principal's security level on the message decreases from unknown to private; every time the mes sage is sent on the network the secret level of the message is decreased (for example from private to tradedl, from By comparing the solutions of the policy and the given imputable sesps we can formally define a confidentiality attack.
Definition 2 (Confidentiality attack)
Given the policy sesp P for a given protocol, and an im putable sesp p for the same protocol, that there is a con fidentiality attack by A on m in p iff i-confidentiality of m in P for A holds, i'-confidentiality of m in p for A holds, and (' < l.
Therefore, if Soi(P) .JJ {A}= {Def A, {A}), there is a con fidentiality attack by A on m in p iff de! A (m) < De! A (m).
Attacks can be realistically compared: the more an at tack lowers a security level allowed by the policy sesp, the worse that attack.
We exemplify this treatment on the Needham-Schroeder protocol seen above ( §III). Figure 5 presents the fragment of policy sesp for the protocol pertaining to a single ses-0-7803-8572-1/04/$20.00 ©2004 IEEE sion between principals A and B. Notice the unary con straints fo rmalising each principal's security levels prior to the beginning of any protocol session, and the binary con straints each formalising a session step. In particular, while A's security level on her nonce Na was initially private before any session began, it is lowered to tradedI by en tailment as soon as A invents it and sends it off in step 2 of the protocol. Similarly, B's security level on Nb is traded2 though it was originally private. The figure omits all details that are irrelevant to the session. For example all other principals' security levels on Na and Nb are unknown because the policy prescribes that no-one acts maliciously. there is a confidentiality attack by C on Nb in this prob lem, because Nb got level unknown in the policy sesp.
The problem solution projected on variable B associates security level traded2 to the nonce Na, which instead got level unknown in the policy sesp. This signifies that B has learnt a nonce that he was not allowed to learn by policy, hence there is an indeliberate confidentiality attack by B on Na. Notice that the two attacks (the deliberate [20] 
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have laid the ground towards the development of a definition of Information Assurance for secure distributed communications. We require reliance on security protocols previously analysed accurately, realistically and fo rmally.
"Accurately" means that the protocol goals should not be considered mere boolean properties because security never is a boolean fe ature. By contrast, we advocate rea soning about levels of confidentiality or authentication.
"Realistically" means that the model underlying the analy sis should exceed the limits of the classical Dolev and Yao's model. We showed how this highlights another consequence of Lowe's attack on the popular asymmetric Needham Schroeder protocol. "Formally" means that the analysis should be conducted within a formal framework.
The literature seems to be missing an approach to proto col analysis that embeds all the three fe atures, so we have sketched a new approach based on Constraint Solving. Ad mittedly, some details had to be hidden from the presen tation of the approach. But rather than convincing that this is the best approach, our purpose was to convince the reader that the three requirements we set towards Informa tion Assurance for secure distributed communications can 
